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HEN Canada, Mexico, and the United States entered into the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994,1
economists proclaimed the agreement to be a significant step
toward shared economic prosperity in the Americas.2 Simultaneously,
environmental supporters feared that increased trade and reallocation of
labor across borders would lead to environmental degradation in Mex-
ico.3 Consequently, the parties to NAFTA drafted the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)4 as a side agree-
ment intended to address these environmental concerns, thus labeling
NAFTA the greenest trade agreement to date.5
A decade after NAFTA, environmentalists and legislators must analyze
the successes and failures of the NAAEC as applied to Mexico in efforts
to propose more environmentally friendly legislation. 6 In doing so, it is
necessary to evaluate the state of environmental regulation in Mexico
prior to NAFTA and the NAAEC, and to explore how the NAAEC and
the trilateral enforcement organization it established, known as the Com-
mission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC),7 serve to remedy the va-
rious environmental inadequacies of Mexican law. Ultimately, proposed
*Nicholas G. Peters is a 2006 graduate from the Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law where he served as an Article Editor for the International
Law Review and was a member of the Barristers.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Edie Ringel, Comment, NAFTA and Local Governments: The Effects of Free
Trade on State and Local Environmental Legislation, Part 1, 18 No. 6 NAAG NAT'L
ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3 (2003).
3. See id.; see also Robert C. Hale, Assessing the CEC's Impact on NAFTA, 13 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 561 (2004) (reviewing GREENING NAFTA: THE
NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (David L.
Markell & John H. Knox eds. 2003)).
4. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC].
5. Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Into the Americas, 33
ENVTL. L. 501, 503 (2003).
6. GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 12-13 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds. 2003) [hereinafter
GREENING NAFTA].
7. Id. at 2.
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amendments to Mexican law, as well as the CEC, will lead to a more
beneficial blend of economic and environmental prosperity. 8
II. MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PRIOR TO NAFIA
Mexico is relatively new at environmental regulation. 9 Whereas the
United States established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
1970,10 Mexico enacted its primary environmental statute, known as the
General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Protection of the Environ-
ment (hereinafter "Ecology Law"), in 1988.11 Based largely on the strict-
ness of U.S. environmental policy, the Ecology Law established statutes
and penalties governing "air pollution, water pollution, soil degradation,
toxic and hazardous wastes, and conservation.' 2 In addition, the Ecol-
ogy Law vested the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) with
the authority to serve as the centralized environmental enforcement
agency of Mexico.13 SEDESOL is essentially the Mexican equivalent of
the EPA.14 Although Mexico's environmental laws were based heavily
on U.S. legislation, the country's enforcement mechanism was inadequate
due to deficiencies in its judicial system and poor funding for its various
programs. 15
A. SEDESOL's ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
A primary roadblock to environmental enforcement in Mexico is the
structure of its civil law system.16 Because SEDESOL uses administra-
tive hearings to interpret and enforce its laws, the judicial system is
largely absent from the process. 17 Unlike the common law system in the
United States, where courts interpret and enforce the law through stare
decisis, Mexican environmental enforcement is comprised of a series of
administrative rulings that bear no effect on the result of future proceed-
ings.18 Thus, subsequent administrative proceedings are not bound by a
rule of law taken from a prior similar action, and as a result, there can be
numerous incongruities from holding to holding.19 Another problem
8. Id. at 17.
9. David L. Hanna, Third World Texas: NAFTA, State Law, and Environmental
Problems Facing, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 871, 888 (1996).
10. Id. at 886.
11. Joseph E. Sinnot, The Classic CivilCommon Law Dichotomy and Its Effects on the
Functional Equivalence of the Contemporary Environmental Law Enforcement
Mechanisms of the United States and Mexico, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273,
285 (1999).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 287.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 274; see also Hanna, supra note 9, at 891 (Mexico's unwillingness to
support its environmental policy indicates that the regulations it has put into place
are little more than "political rhetoric").
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with this system of relying on administrative proceedings is that there can
be an "inherent bias" against private parties since SEDESOL both brings
forth and adjudicates disputes.20
B. THE AMPARO PROCESS
An additional barrier that the Mexican judicial system imposes on en-
forcement of its environmental laws comes from the inability of private
parties to file class action suits. In the United States and Canada, one
member of a group can have standing to sue a party on behalf of all the
other members of his or her group.21 Therefore, individuals and non-
government organizations (NGOs) can have standing to sue.22
The Mexican judicial system, by contrast, does not provide this op-
tion.23 Instead, Mexicans can file an amparo claim to gain direct access to
the courts. 24 But two limitations make this process inefficient in resolving
environmental matters.25 First, although NGOs and environmental
watch groups are better equipped to file suits because of their expertise
and financial support, it is extremely difficult for these organizations to
achieve standing to sue.26 Because the Mexican Supreme Court narrowly
construes standing so as to maintain litigation as a dispute between indi-
vidual parties, a plaintiff must show harm before attaining standing.27
Second, an amparo decision does not interpret the disputed law, and it is
not binding on other parties.28 Therefore, if a court determines that an
environmental regulation is unconstitutional, the only person affected by
this determination is the party to the suit.2 9 The decision will have no
bearing on how future parties interpret or abide by the law. 30 Conse-
quently, although a strong environmental framework exists under the
Ecology Law, Mexico's civil-law system is wholly inadequate in enforcing
the law.
C. THE PROBLEM OF FUNDING
Insufficient funding also contributes to Mexico's sub-optimal enforce-
ment of environmental laws. 31 A study has shown that although the
20. Sinnot, supra note 11, at 294.
21. Dr. Lucio Cabrera Acevedo, Past and Possible Future of the Collective Amparo
Process (Amparo Colectivo), 6 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 35 (1998).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Katherine M. Bailey, Note, Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement in




27. Id. at 336-37.
28. Id. at 337.
29. Bailey, supra note 24, at 337.
30. See id. (noting that only when the court reaches the same decision on the same
constitutional question five times in a row does the rule becomes known as juris-
prudencia and become binding on all lower courts).
31. See Hanna, supra note 9, at 890; see also Sinnot, supra note 11, at 295.
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Ecology Law is capable of being as effective as U.S. environmental law,
the country "has lacked the personnel and funding to provide for ade-
quate enforcement. ' 32 Research identifies a direct link between funding
and enforcement. 33 From 1988 to 1990, the Mexican government con-
ducted 5,405 inspections that resulted in three permanent plant closings
and 980 partial and temporary closings. 34 From June 1992 to September
1993, after increased funding, SEDESOL conducted 16,386 inspections
that resulted in 100 permanent plant closings and 1,161 partial plant clos-
ings.35 Thus, as SEDESOL's enforcement budget increased, so did the
number and effectiveness of its enforcement efforts. The problem, how-
ever, is that Mexico has very limited means of increasing its environmen-
tal budget, and to do so would entail diverting funds from other
budgetary concerns. 36 Therefore, Mexico's capacity to adequately en-
force its environmental regulations is limited by the country's inability to
equip SEDESOL with the financial resources to do so.
Looking at Mexico's environmental policy prior to NAFTA and the
NAAEC, it is apparent that although the essential framework was capa-
ble of being at least as effective as the environmental laws of the United
States, the country was severely hampered by inefficiencies in its judicial
system as well as budgetary constraints.37 Because the actions of admin-
istrative proceedings are not binding and are inherently biased, they are
an insufficient means of enforcement. 38 In addition, since NGOs are pro-
hibited from filing amparo suits and the decisions of the courts are not
enforceable against other parties, Mexico's judicial system serves as an
inadequate avenue of enforcement. 39 Finally, Mexico's various economic
and industrial needs bar allocation of much needed financial support to
SEDESOL, hampering the agency's ability to enforce its laws.40 In light
of these roadblocks, pre-NAFTA Mexico was a country with the neces-
sary environmental agenda but with no means of enforcing its legislation.
III. THE NAAEC, THE CEC, AND THE CITIZEN
SUBMISSION PROCESS
Before NAFTA received congressional approval, seven large U.S. envi-
ronmental groups strongly recommended making a side agreement that
would essentially encompass a promise by Canada, Mexico, and the
United States to enforce their current environmental legislation and es-
tablish an international enforcement regime. 41 The three nations signed
32. C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the
NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 103-04 (1994).
33. See Sinnot, supra note 11, at 295-96.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Hanna, supra note 9, at 890-91.
37. See Bailey, supra note 24, at 336; see also Sinnot, supra note 11, at 294-96.
38. Hanna, supra note 9, at 889.
39. Bailey, supra note 24, at 337.
40. Hanna, supra note 9, at 890-91.
41. GREENING NAFTA, supra note 6, at 7-9.
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the NAAEC in 1993 and based it largely on the U.S. recommendations. 42
As previously stated, the NAAEC was promulgated to address growing
fears that NAFTA would cause industry to migrate to Mexico, damaging
the U.S. economy and making Mexico an environmental wasteland. 43
These concerns have been grouped into the following six categories: 1)
"border cleanup"; 2) the threat that Mexico would degrade into a "pollu-
tion haven"; 3) "threats to domestic environmental laws"; 4) "threats to
international environmental agreements"; 5) "public participation"; and
6) "environmental assessment."'44 Some environmentalists also feared
that the United States would relax some of its environmental regulations
in efforts to keep industry from migrating to Mexico, leading both coun-
tries into a "race for the bottom" in terms of environmental enforce-
ment. 45 Thus, legislators realized the need to adopt a side agreement to
NAFTA that would establish a new enforcement regime capable of main-
taining a proper balance between trade, economic needs, and environ-
mental protection. 46 As a result, Canada, Mexico, and the United States
adopted the NAAEC in 1993 to "foster the protection and improvement
of the environment in the territories of the Parties. ' 47 An analysis of the
NAAEC, the CEC, and its citizen submission process indicates that al-
though not perfect, the side agreement has done much in furtherance of
its objective to correct the aforementioned inadequacies in Mexican envi-
ronmental law.48
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CEC
Part three of the NAAEC establishes the CEC to function as the "insti-
tutional framework for cooperation" in the design, promulgation, and en-
forcement of programs in furtherance of environmental objectives. 49
Hence, the CEC serves as a forum for communication between the three
parties to the NAAEC that can recommend various courses of action,
investigate violations, and levy sanctions. However, the CEC only has
the authority to impose sanctions on a party "where there has been a
persistent pattern of failure by the offending party to effectively enforce
its environmental laws." '50
The tri-national CEC consists of the Council of Ministers, the Secreta-
42. Id. at 9.
43. These concerns were motivated by the Mexican maquiladora program. This was a
policy that encouraged foreign industry to populate a region along Mexico's north-
ern border. The program succeeded in its goals, but it simultaneously overloaded
water/waste cleaning facilities and heavily polluted the Rio Grande and the sur-
rounding water supply. See id. at 3.
44. Id. at 4-7.
45. David W. Ronald, The Role of the CEC in Balancing Free Trade with Environmen-
tal Protection, 12 No. 2 NAAG NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3, 5 (1997).
46. Jorge Diep, Significant Developments in Mexico: New Initiatives for a New Envi-
ronmental Policy, SD66 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 261 (1999).
47. NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 1.
48. Ronald, supra note 45, at 4.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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riat, and the Joint Public Advisory.51 The Council of Ministers is the
CEC's governing body and is made up of representatives from Canada,
Mexico, and the United States.52 The Council essentially has open-ended
authority to seek advice from private environmental groups with regard
to the implementation of environmental agendas.5 3 In addition, the
Council has the power to make a factual record developed by the Secre-
tariat public upon a two-thirds vote.54 Although the Council performs
many other functions, it should be noted that articles 34 and 36 allow the
Council to determine if a party's conduct constitutes a persistent pattern
of failures to abide by its environmental regulations and impose sanctions
where necessary. 55
The Secretariat is headed by an executive director chosen by the Coun-
cil for a three-year term, and the executive director has the authority to
appoint the staff of the Secretariat at will.56 Although one of the objec-
tives of the Secretariat is to provide the Council with "technical, adminis-
trative and operational support," 57 perhaps the greatest responsibility of
the Secretariat is its involvement in the citizen submission process and its
ability to prepare factual reports for the Council.58 Article 14, one of the
enforcement provisions of the NAAEC, gives the Secretariat the power
to review submissions from any person or NGO who alleges a party is
failing to enforce its environmental laws.59 Based on its findings in this
review, the Secretariat can file a factual report to the Council, which, as
previously stated, has the power to publicize it subsequent to a two-thirds
vote. 60 Furthermore, the Secretariat may develop a factual report on any
issue relevant to the CEC if it chooses to do so. 61
Finally, the Joint Public Advisory Committee consists of fifteen mem-
bers who have the authority to advise the Council and the Secretariat on
matters that fall under the umbrella of the NAAEC.62 In addition, the
Committee provides the Council and Secretariat with public opinion from
citizens of the party countries.63 Thus, the Joint Public Advisory Com-
mittee serves as the Council and the Secretariat's direct link to NGOs
and individual citizens of each party to the agreement.
51. See NAAEC, supra note 4, arts. 8-14; see also Kal Raustiala, The Political Implica-
tions of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement:
The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 40 (1995).
52. NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 9.
53. Raustiala, supra note 51, at 40.
54. Id.
55. See NAAEC, supra note 4, arts. 34 & 36; see also Ronald, supra, note 45, at 4.
Note that the typical sanctions imposed are suspension of benefits a party is to
receive under NAFTA.
56. NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 11.
57. Id.
58. Ronald, supra note 45, at 4.
59. NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 14.
60. Ronald, supra note 45, at 4.
61. Id.
62. NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 16.
63. See id.; see also Ronald, supra note 45, at 3-4.
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B. THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS
Any NGO or individual citizen that resides in Canada, Mexico, or the
United States may submit a form of complaint to the CEC alleging that
one of the parties has failed to enforce its own environmental laws.6 4
This is how the citizen participation process is initiated. Once this NGO
or individual files its submission with the Secretariat, the Secretariat re-
views the case and determines whether an investigation would further the
objectives of the NAAEC, whether any action has been pursued under
the party's environmental laws, and, similar to standing, whether the per-
son or group has been harmed by the party's actions.6 5 Depending on
what the Secretariat determines from this review, it may request a re-
sponse from the party complained of in the submission. 66
Assuming the Secretariat elicits a response, it then reviews the re-
sponse and the submission to determine whether to inform the Council
that the Secretariat will make a factual record on the matter.67 At this
point, the Council determines by a two-thirds vote whether to have the
Secretariat go through with the factual record.6 8 If the Council votes
against the factual record, the submission essentially dies there. But if
the Council approves the factual record, then the Secretariat has the au-
thority to prepare one based on any facts or data submitted by NGOs,
citizens, or the Public Advisory Committee.69 Finally, after compiling the
factual record, the Council votes to determine whether to make the fac-
tual record public.70 Public disclosure requires, as before, a two-thirds
vote.7
1
The findings of a factual record are known as "soft international
law."'72 In other words, the CEC has no real means of enforcing its find-
ings or proposals. For the most part, countries do not choose, and have
not chosen, to abide by the CEC's recommendations. 73 The parties to the
NAAEC seem reluctant to give the CEC any real teeth.7 4 Yet some sug-
gest that the true power of this soft law is that it creates a certain amount
of transparency among North American governments. 75 Publicizing the
64. Bailey, supra note 24, at 354-55.
65. See id.; see also NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 14(1).
66. Bailey, supra note 24, at 355.
67. Id. (explaining that "the NAAEC offers no criteria on how the Secretariat makes
this decision, except to disqualify a submission if the matter is the subject of a
pending judicial or administrative proceeding").
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 355-56.
71. Bailey, supra note 24, at 355-56.
72. Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger Awakens: North American Environmental
Law After the Cosumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 395, 472 (2001)
(internal quotations omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. It appears that Canada, Mexico, and the United States are reluctant to amend
the NAAEC so as to give the CEC's factual records force because of the potential
costs of being forced to come into compliance.
75. Bailey, supra note 24, at 356.
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factual record allows each nation and, in turn, the public to know which
party is failing to enforce its own environmental regulations. Experts feel
this could help stimulate public participation and ultimately lead to in-
creased accountability. 7
6
IV. DOES THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS OF THE
NAAEC BENEFIT MEXICO?
A. BENEFITS
In the eleven years since the NAAEC was signed, the actions of the
CEC have had a positive impact on environmental regulation in Mex-
ico.77 The CEC indicates that since 1995, there have been forty-seven
submissions made to the Secretariat. 78 Of these submissions, twenty-
seven involved Mexico and resulted in four factual records. 79 Several
other positive outcomes are apparent and are described below.
1. Transparency
First, the citizen submission process has helped increase the trans-
parency of the Mexican government.8 0 Mexican citizens are aware of the
CEC's powers to access important "policies, decision making records...
and public Council sessions," and have grown to expect the same manner
of openness in other government agencies.8 1
2. Standing
Second, the process serves as a means for NGOs and certain individu-
als to circumvent the standing problem addressed above. Because a sub-
mission can be made by anyone in the three member parties,8 2 an NGO
or individual does not need to allege harm to have standing.
3. Positive Externalities
The CEC and the citizen submission process can also be credited with
guiding Mexican environmental regulation in a few areas.8 3 For instance,
the CEC was pivotal in leading Mexico to adopt a "national pollutant
76. Id.
77. Block, supra note 5, at 516.
78. NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, CITIZEN
SUBMISSIONS ON ENFORCEMENT MATTERS: CURRENT STATUS OF FILED SUBMIS-
SIONS (October 5, 2004), http://www.cec.org/citizen/status/index.cfm?varlan=
English.
79. Id.
80. See Block, supra note 5, at 516; see also Bailey, supra note 24, at 356.
81. Block, supra note 5, at 516.
82. See Bailey, supra note 24, at 356; see also David L. Markell, The Commission For
Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission Process, 12 GEO. INTL. ENVTL.
L. REv. 545, 560-61 (2000) (discussing a Cozumel, Mexico submission where the
Secretariat found that the submission was within the objectives of the NAAEC
despite the fact that the party failed to allege that there was actual harm normally
needed for legal standing in a civil suit).
83. Block, supra note 5, at 516-17.
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release and transfer registry" that was on par with similar regulations in
the United States.84 Furthermore, the CEC set into motion a process that
eventually led to prohibiting the use of such toxic substances as DDT and
chlordane in Mexico. 85 Consider the fact that the CEC has been able to
make these positive impacts with minimal funding and without much le-
gal clout.86
B. SHORTCOMINGS
1. The CEC Lacks Teeth
Despite the modest advancements the CEC has made, the agency and
the citizen submission process are still plagued with setbacks. As previ-
ously mentioned, one of the main shortcomings of the CEC is that its
findings do not hold significant power.87 The commission's recommenda-
tions are rarely given credence, and its authority to impose sanctions is
hampered in several ways. Monetary penalties or the suspension of
NAFTA benefits are only enforced when a party is found to have failed
to enforce its environmental laws.88 Such a finding requires a two-thirds
vote by the Council and is highly unlikely to occur.89 Moreover, any such
fine is capped at .007 percent of the "total trade in goods between the
parties" and must be allocated to the offending nation's environmental
regulations fund.90 Finally, should any party refuse to pay the fine, it can
drop out of the NAAEC without forfeiting its status as a member of
NAFTA.91
2. Time
Another problem with the process stems from the amount of time it
takes to get from the submission stage all the way to a factual record.92
On average, the process takes up to five years. 93 Some feel this is too
lengthy and arduous a process to justify the relatively uneventful and
non-binding resolution that is the factual record. 94 In addition, there is
little data suggesting the impact of factual records to date.95
84. Id. at 516.
85. Id. at 517.
86. Id.
87. Kibel, supra note 72, at 472.
88. Ronald, supra note 45, at 4-5.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Bailey, supra note 24, at 356-57.
93. Id. at 357.
94. Id. at 356-57.
95. Bailey discusses the Metales y Derivados Factual Record concerning the removal
of waste that had made its way into Mexico. Although some foresaw that the
factual record would inform the public and lead it to demand changes in the be-
havior of companies, the effects will take years to be realize as "new policies and
practices slowly come to light." See id. at 357.
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3. Net Effect
The positive effects of the CEC and the citizen submission process,
thus far, may be summarized as considerable in theory but nominal in
practice. That being said, the process leaves Mexico no worse off than it
would be without the framework imposed by the NAAEC. 96 After
eleven years of existence, the CEC and its processes are better employed
as a public forum for the dissemination of ideas concerning the imple-
mentation of environmental regulations as well as the promotion of more
eco-friendly trade.97 The commission is limited, however, by the paucity
of power given to it in the NAAEC.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Mexico has put into place an environmental regulatory
scheme capable of being as effective as the framework in the United
States,98 it is severely inhibited by its judicial system99 as well as a lack of
funding.1°° Perhaps expanding the amparo process to give NGOs and
individuals a cause of action similar to a class action lawsuit would en-
hance the ability of environmental watchdog groups to initiate more
stringent environmental enforcement. 10 1 Nevertheless, the civil-law sys-
tem in Mexico is still inadequate due to a lack of stare decisis among the
courts,10 2 and the Ecology Law is at a serious detriment with regards to
funding.10 3 Without addressing these issues, the Mexican government
will not have a reasonable chance of truly living up to the spirit of the
NAAEC.
The NAAEC, however, reconciles the issue of standing. 0 4 Any citizen
or NGO can file a submission, meaning that the environmental watchdog
groups mentioned above are assured of some forum to bring their dis-
putes through the use of the citizen submission process. 0 5 In addition,
over the last eleven years, the CEC has evolved into a forum for the com-
munication of ideas, concerns, and suggestions for the development of
environmental regulations between the member nations. 0 6 By essen-
tially placing a delinquent party in the spotlight, the CEC simultaneously
encourages reform by that party as well as any others who may be failing
96. Id.
97. Ronald, supra note 45, at 5.
98. See Bailey, supra note 24, at 336.
99. Id. at 337.
100. Hanna, supra note 9, at 890-91.
101. Some advocate the adoption of a colectivo amparo process that is similar in con-
cept to a class action lawsuit. Dr. Acevedo argues that the adoption of this process
is supported by the international need for Mexico to comply with NAFrA, as well
as the democratic need for some adequate form of judicial review. The colectivo
amparo would ensure human rights by allowing NGO's and individuals to file class
action suits. See generally Acevedo, supra note 21.
102. Bailey, supra note 24, at 337.
103. Hanna, supra note 9, at 890-91.
104. See generally NAAEC, supra note 4.
105. See Bailey, supra note 24, at 356; see also Markell, supra note 82, at 560-61.
106. Ronald, supra note 45, at 5.
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to enforce their own environmental laws. Even so, it is apparent that the
NAAEC is not a perfectly green agreement and could use some fine-
tuning.107 Should the parties choose to reform the accord, significant
consideration must be given to broadening the CEC's authority. Without
question, a CEC with more bite will ultimately lead to greener trade be-
tween Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The challenge will come
in doing so without encouraging the race for the bottom that environmen-
talists feared in the formation of NAFTA.
107. Id. at 4-5; see also Bailey, supra note 24, at 356-57.
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